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In an earlier article, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine,' we ad-
vanced the following account of the constitutional law bearing on
delegation of federal legislative power. A statutory grant of authority
to the executive branch or other agents can never amount to a delega-
tion of legislative power. Agents acting within the terms of such a
statutory grant are exercising executive power, not legislative power.
The standard nondelegation doctrine, which holds that statutory
grants of authority "amount to" or "effect" a delegation of legislative
power if they are too broad or confer excessive discretion, is no more
than a vague and ultimately uncashable metaphor. As it turns out, the
standard nondelegation doctrine has no real pedigree in constitutional
text and structure, in originalist understandings, or in judicial prece-
dent; nor can plausible arguments from democratic theory or social
welfare be marshaled to support it.
Larry Alexander and Saikrishna Prakash have written a response
that criticizes our account. (Although Alexander and Prakash criticize
our view, they are noticeably ambivalent about the conventional doc-
trine.' As we shall see, their arguments commit them to defending a
different, radically restrictive account of delegation, one in which any
issuance of rules and regulations by the executive branch represents
an unconstitutional exercise of legislative power.) Alexander and
Prakash make three principal points. First, focusing on one implication
of our account-that a delegation of legislative power would occur if
federal legislators ceded their de jure legislative powers, such as voting
rights, to nonlegislators-they say that our account "elevates form
over substance" by permitting "equivalent" results to be produced
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through statutory grants of authority.' Second, they advance an
originalist account of constitutional lawmaking. In their view, "at the
founding, the legislative power was understood as the authority to
make rules for the governance of society, whether or not exercised by
a legislature."' Third, they combine two residual criticisms of our ac-
count by saying both that the historical evidence for it is scant, and
that our account would permit sweeping delegations of congressional
authority.'
Each of these points is either irrelevant or unpersuasive. The first
merely emphasizes that, as is common in constitutional law, the non-
delegation doctrine is a formal rule that does not police all substitute
mechanisms by which Congress might achieve a similar effect. Al-
though Alexander and Prakash's argument might have force if statu-
tory grants of policy discretion were a costless substitute for formal
delegations of voting rights, they are not. As for the second point, the
evidence supporting it is systematically ambiguous, and in any event
that evidence does not yield the standard nondelegation doctrine. In-
stead it yields the eccentric view that any executive rulemaking is
constitutional "lawmaking." On this view, the administrative state is
unconstitutional. The third point mistakes our historical claim, which
was just that the originalist evidence is equivocal until the First Con-
gress; and Alexander and Prakash's repackaged version of the slip-
pery-slope argument against delegation rests on an implausible hy-
pothesis about congressional behavior.
I. NONDELEGATION: FORM AND SUBSTANCE
On our account, when the President' engages in rulemaking or
other action within the terms of a statutory grant of authority, he exer-
4 ld at 1303.
5 Id at 1305.
6 ld at 1326-28. Another argument in this Part-that a constitutional constraint on formal
voting delegations logically entails a constraint on statutory delegations-essentially repeats
Alexander and Prakash's first point. Compare id at 1323-24 (arguing that "the logic of [our] ar-
guments against the conventional nondelegation doctrine likewise suggests that there is no naive
prohibition"), with id at 1301 (claiming they "see little reason for specifying a detailed selection
process if those selected may transfer the substance of their legislative discretion to persons who
are not selected by that process").
7 As Alexander and Prakash use the term "rulemaking," it encompasses not only rulemak-
ing in the technical sense of the Administrative Procedure Act, but also adjudication, or indeed
any process by which executive agents issue legally binding edicts. See id at 1305-4)6 ("A general
pronouncement creating, modifying, or rescinding legal obligations and rights is a law, regardless
of who pronounces it and irrespective of whether the lawmaking is statutorily authorized or
not.").
8 Or other statutorily authorized agents. See Posner and Vermeule, 69 U Chi L Rev at
1725 & n 9 (cited in note 1) (emphasizing that nothing "turns on the identity of the delegate" and
that, as far as the nondelegation doctrine is concerned, the recipient of the statutory grant of au-
thority could be the President, any other executive officer or independent agency, or even parties
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cises executive power-the power to execute a duly enacted statute-
regardless of the broad scope or discretionary character of the grant.
The President exercises legislative power when, as the majority opin-
ion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co v Sawyer' said, he makes binding
rules without constitutional or statutory authority;' on our account,
this is the only situation in which executive-branch rulemaking
amounts to legislation. A corollary of this picture is that a congres-
sional grant of authority does not transfer or delegate legislative
power; instead it represents an exercise of legislative power. Congress
might delegate legislative power in other ways, however. Consider Jus-
tice Scalia's example: "[L]egislative powers have never been thought
delegable" in the sense that "Senators and Members of the House
may not send delegates to consider and vote upon bills in their
place.""
Alexander and Prakash think this picture excessively formalistic.
They dispute that constitutional law should draw a line between pro-
hibited formal delegations and permitted grants of statutory authority.
In their view, barring delegation of legislators' de jure powers, such as
the power to vote, while permitting "equivalent" statutory grants of
authority is "pointless."" That combination of rules, they contend, al-
lows Congress to circumvent the prohibition of de jure delegations
through statutory grants that amount to de facto delegations.
But this is a perfectly ordinary problem of form and substance, or
of rules and standards; the problem is ubiquitous in constitutional law.
It is the most common thing in the world for law to take the form of
rules rather than standards, even though any rule is -exposed to Alex-
ander and Prakash's charge that the rule is underinclusive" relative to
its purposes, and thus permits circumvention through substitutes.4 To
speak only of constitutional rules, consider a small selection of other
settings in which the Constitution (as written or as interpreted) adopts
formal limits or prohibitions while permitting close substitutes that
have similar de facto effects to go unpoliced.
9 To begin with Article I: The Commerce Clause authorizes Con-
gress to enact direct coercive regulation of commerce-related subjects;
outside the federal government altogether).
9 343 US 579 (1952).
10 See id at 585, 589 ("The President's power, if any, to issue the order must stem either
from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself.").
1 Mistretta v United States, 488 US 361,425 (1989) (Scalia dissenting).
12 Alexander and Prakash, 70 U Chi L Rev at 1303 (cited in note 2).
13 Or overinclusive, but Alexander and Prakash do not make this point.
14 See Frederick Schauer, Playing by the Rules: A Philosophical Examination of Rule-Based
Decision-Making in Law and in Life 32 (Oxford 1991) (stating that the under-inclusiveness of
rules results in their "not covering some states of affairs that would produce in particular cases
the consequence representing the justification for the rule").
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the Supreme Court in some eras (roughly, before 1937 and after 1995)
polices the Commerce Clause by invalidating statutes that exceed the
Clause's scope. Under the Spending Clause and Treaty Clause, how-
ever, Congress may use bribes or international agreements to institute
policies that it could not enact directly under the Commerce Clause.
Although some decisions of the Lochner Court attempted to police
this circumvention of Commerce Clause authority," those decisions
are now widely discredited, " and the Court's current stance is quite
permissive of congressional circumvention under both the Spending
Clause and the Treaty Clause.'7 Nor have occasional academic com-
plaints, much like Alexander and Prakash's, changed the picture.'
* An Article III example involves the finality of judicial judg-
ments. Under the rule of Plaut v Spendthrift Farm, Inc, Congress may
not enact statutes that formally reopen the final judgments of Article
III courts. This rule would, it seems, permit Congress to enact a close
substitute: a statute that retroactively extends the statute of limita-
tions for new causes of action. Alexander and Prakash are committed
to condemning Plaut as a pointless formalism, and to proposing that
constitutional law police any substitutes that achieve the same effect
as formal reopening of judgments.2'
15 See, for example, United States v Butler. 297 US 1 (1936) (finding the Agricultural Ad-
justment Act unconstitutional because it attempted to use Congress's taxing power to regulate
agriculture, which Congress does not have the power to regulate).
16 Compare id with Steward Machine Co v Davis, 301 US 548 (1937) (upholding a federal
tax inducing states to offer unemployment insurance).
17 See South Dakota v Dole, 483 US 203 (1987) (holding that congressional use of federal
highway funds to indirectly regulate alcohol age limits in states is a valid use of the spending
power); Missouri v Holland, 252 US 416 (1920) (holding that a treaty protecting migratory birds
from intrastate harms does not violate the Tenth Amendment or general principles of federalism,
even if an equivalent statute would exceed Congress's commerce power).
18 On spending, see Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending after Lopez, 95 Colum L
Rev 1911, 1916 (1995) (arguing that the Court "should reinterpret the Spending Clause to work
in tandem, rather than at odds, with its reading of the Commerce Clause"). On treaties, see Cur-
tis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 Mich L Rev 390,394 (1998) (argu-
ing "that if federalism is to be the subject of judicial protection-as the current Supreme Court
appears to believe-there is no justification for giving the treaty power special immunity from
such protection").
19 514 US 211, 240 (1995) (holding a federal statute unconstitutional "to the extent that it
requires federal courts to reopen final judgments entered before its enactment").
2) See Richard H. Fallon, Daniel J. Meltzer, and David L. Shapiro, Hart and Wechsler's The
Federal Courts and The Federal System 107 (Foundation 4th ed 1996) ("In the absence of a final
judgment dismissing a lawsuit, the Court in Plaut did not question Congress' power to enact laws
... to authorize suits that otherwise would be time-barred.").
21 Alexander and Prakash suggest a different Article IlI analogy. Assume that Article III
judges may not cede their de jure voting rights to executive officials. Surely, according to Alexan-
der and Prakash, a court could not circumvent this rule by saying that the "rights and duties of
the parties are whatever [the executive official] determines those legal rights and duties to be."
See Alexander and Prakash, 70 U Chi L Rev at 1302-03. But see Chevron v Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc, 467 US 837 (1984) (establishing that where statutes are silent or ambigu-
ous, Article Ill courts say that the law is whatever executive officials say the law is). Alexander
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* The most pointed example, however, stems from Article II
rather than Article III, and involves delegation itself. If (as on the
conventional nondelegation view) the vesting of legislative powers in
the Congress entails some restriction on the scope or precision of con-
gressional grants of statutory authority to executive agents, then by
parity of reasoning the Article II Vesting Clause, which vests the "ex-
ecutive power" in the President, should entail a parallel restriction on
the scope or precision of delegations by the President to his agents.
Defenders of the conventional view ought to subscribe to a parallel
Article II nondelegation doctrine, under which the President must
provide an "intelligible principle" sufficient to guide the legal discre-
tion of subordinate executive officers. Lacking such a principle, the
grants of authority to subordinate officers would amount to an uncon-
stitutional delegation of executive authority, which the Constitution
vests in the President alone. But to our knowledge, no one has ever
suggested that the Subdelegation Act" violates the Constitution, even
though it authorizes executive delegations that lack any intelligible
principle. Where the Act authorizes subdelegation," the only legal re-
striction on presidential grants of executive authority is that the action
of subordinate executive officials must comply with the terms of the
grant-precisely the restriction our account imposes on congressional
delegations to the executive.
To be sure, there might be good constitutional reasons to treat in-
trabranch delegations (within the executive) differently from inter-
branch ones (from Congress to the executive). But this response is not
open to Alexander and Prakash, because their concern about circum-
vention is too blunt an instrument to handle such nuances. The Presi-
dent may not cede to another the de jure powers of his office, such as
the power to execute the laws; why then, on Alexander and Prakash's
and Prakash's position on delegation parallels the criticism, as yet unsuccessful, that Chevron in
effect cedes to executive agencies the judiciary's power to say "what the law is." See Cynthia R.
Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 Colum L
Rev 452,452,456 (1989). Our position parallels the prevailing view: A legal rule like Chevron it-
self says what the law is, with the content of the law filled in by the executive acting within the
statute's scope. See Cass R. Sunstein, Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional?, 98 Mich L Rev 303,
350-51 (1999) ("It is odd to say that a statute violates the nondelegation doctrine because of how
it has been construed by the relevant agency.... This idea converts the nondelegation doctrine
into something else altogether.").
22 Pub L No 82-248,65 Stat 710,713 (1951), codified at 3 USC § 301 et seq (2000) (author-
izing the President to delegate any of his executive powers to the head of any executive depart-
ment or agency).
23 See Donald A. Dripps, Delegation and Due Process, 1988 Duke L J 657, 666
("[D]elegation of executive power is not subject to the intelligible principle requirement.").
24 The Act does not authorize subdelegation if a statute affirmatively prohibits it or spe-
cifically designates an officer to whom the authority may be subdelegated. See 3 USC § 302.
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reasoning, should he be allowed to achieve the same end by delegating
law-enforcement power to subordinates?
The upshot of these examples is that Alexander and Prakash's
charge of excessive formalism seems arbitrarily selective. Constitu-
tional rules are "pointless," in just Alexander and Prakash's sense,
whenever they are underinclusive relative to their purposes; and this
sort of underinclusion is extremely common, because legal formality
has systemic virtues that Alexander and Prakash's approach neglects.
In the delegation case, for example, a rule barring only formal delega-
tions is far easier for constitutional interpreters (legislators as well as
judges) to monitor and enforce than the inquiry that the conventional
nondelegation test requires. Alexander and Prakash's circumvention
complaint, which essentially converts all rules into standards by argu-
ing that rules must always be tailored to their underlying purposes, ig-
nores systemic costs of this sort. Of course it is true that, in some cir-
cumstances, constitutional law attempts to police de facto circumven-
tions of formal first-order rules; in the choice between rules and stan-
dards, context is all. If Alexander and Prakash are claiming, however,
that the bare possibility of circumvention is sufficient to undermine
rules, their account is dramatically overbroad. Alexander and Prakash
would need to offer a more nuanced account, one that specifies what
features of the current setting distinguish it from a myriad of other
settings in which their concern carries no constitutional weight. Alex-
ander and Prakash have offered no such account here.
In any event, Alexander and Prakash's speculation about circum-
vention is unconvincing on its own terms. Alexander and Prakash's ar-
gument can be characterized as a sort of economic claim: Statutory
grants of authority are not merely a substitute for formal delegations
of voting authority, but in fact a costless one. However, to repeat, it is
not clear that this economic point gets any constitutional leverage. In
some of the examples above the constitutionally permissible substi-
tutes are costly, while in others the substitute seems entirely costless,
as in the use of executive orders to delegate presidential powers.
There is no particular reason to think that the costliness of the substi-
tute is a constitutionally relevant consideration. But the claim is also
implausible, even granting its premises.
The crucial premise of this view must be that legislators desire to
abdicate: to cede as much of their power as possible for as long as pos-
sible. (We take up the empirical plausibility of this picture below; for
now let us follow the logic where it leads.) A constitutional regime
that barred formal delegations of voting authority while permitting a
costless substitution to statutory grants of authority would, on this
view, impose no constraints whatsoever on legislative behavior. But
these alternative routes to abdication are not, in fact, equivalently
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costly. For one thing, Alexander and Prakash seem to make the un-
founded assumption that formal voting delegations could only be ac-
complished by statutory enactments. 2' But the right to vote on pro-
posed statutes must be a right held by individual legislators, not by a
majority of each House; otherwise it would be inexplicable that the
Constitution places elaborate restrictions, including supermajority re-
quirements, on the power of either House to strip its members of their
de jure legislative powers by expelling the member from the body. " In
a regime that permitted formal voting delegations as well as statutory
grants of authority, individual legislators could thus cede their votes to
outsiders without incurring the costs of assembling a majority coali-
tion to vote the delegation into effect. Of course, the benefits to out-
siders might be lower as well, at least assuming that less than a major-
ity of individual legislators opted to cede their votes, but this just
means that formal delegations and statutory grants are very different
legal instruments with a different mix of costs and benefits. Rational
constitutional framers might sensibly prohibit one while leaving the
other to policing by future politics.
Even if statutory delegations of voting rights are at issue, Alexan-
der and Prakash recognize that "giving a vote in Congress to the Sec-
retary [of Commerce] is different from giving the Secretary Con-
gress's policy discretion in this respect: When Congress votes to retract
the latter, the Secretary cannot vote, whereas if he has been validly
given a vote in Congress, he may vote on its retraction."2'7 In other
words, the constitutional requirement that Congress transfer power by
granting rulemaking authority, rather than voting rights, impedes a
25 Alexander and Prakash are cagey about this; it is never quite made explicit. See, for ex-
ample, Alexander and Prakash, 70 U Chi L Rev at 1300, 1302, 1304 n 20. Discarding this assump-
tion also obviates Alexander and Prakash's argument that formal voting delegations, like statu-
tory grants of discretion, must be enacted through bicameralism and presentment. See id at 1302.
26 Alexander and Prakash have two criticisms of this view. First, they say, the text of the
Article I Vesting Clause shows that legislative powers are held by Congress, not by individual
legislators; otherwise the Clause would read: "All powers to vote in Congress and all related
powers of legislators herein granted shall be vested in a Congress." Id at 1307. This rests on an
equivocation. Of course "Congress" is an ambiguous term; sometimes it denotes the federal leg-
islative institution (the first occurrence in Alexander and Prakash's paraphrase), sometimes it
just denotes the summation of individual legislators (the second occurrence). Presumably Alex-
ander and Prakash do not think that some entity called "Congress," over and above the summa-
tion of individual legislators, has the right to vote on pending legislation. Alexander and Prakash
also complain that we have assumed, in a separate work, that the federal legislative power is re-
stricted to the subjects enumerated in Article I, § 8 (and other provisions); Alexander and
Prakash claim that the earlier assumption is inconsistent with our view here. See id at 1309 n 41,
citing Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Legislative Entrenchment:A Reappraisal, 111 Yale L
J 1665, 1675 (2001). But this is quite puzzling. Nothing in our account of delegation is at all in-
consistent with the view that the die jure powers of individual legislators, such as legislative voting
rights, extend only to statutes falling within the enumerated powers.
27 Alexander and Prakash, 70 U Chi L Rev at 1300.
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legislature hell-bent on abdication; it prevents Congress from hamper-
ing the ability of a future Congress to revoke the abdicating statute,
or, for that matter, from enacting new laws that overlap with or con-
tradict the rules created by the delegate. A statutory grant of policy
discretion is thus a costly, hence imperfect, substitute for formal
delegation of voting rights. Alexander and Prakash try to patch the
wound with the observation that a later statute retracting policy
discretion previously granted to the executive branch would be
subject to presidential veto." The problem, though, is that the same is
true of a later statute retracting an earlier delegation of formal voting
rights. So the presidential veto washes out.
Alexander and Prakash might reply that a statutory grant of
rulemaking authority, with an entrenchment, would accomplish the to-
tal legislative abdication that they think the ban on the transfer of vot-
ing rights was intended to prevent. (We assume that they do not make
this argument because they do not believe that legislative entrench-
ment is possible or constitutionally permissible.)" But an entrenched
grant of rulemaking authority is not the same thing as a transfer of
voting rights. Entrenchment statutes are hard to draft because of their
reflexive character, and courts may well require an especially clear
statement before finding entrenchment." Thus entrenchment poses ex-
tra risks, and incurs extra costs, not present in a formal delegation of
voting power. Rules can always be circumvented, but truly costless cir-
cumventions are hard to find.
II. NONDELEGATION AND LEGISLATIVE POWER
Alexander and Prakash argue that the original understanding of
the "legislative power" undermines our account of nondelegation. On
Alexander and Prakash's account, which they take to be the "conven-
tional view," the legislative power is the power to make rules for social
governance, regardless of which branch of government exercises that
28 See id at 1300. Alexander and Prakash add that "of course, Congress could specify that
the Secretary could not vote on bills that would retract his authority." Id. But this loses the
thread of the argument. If the premise is that Congress is intent on permanent abdication, Con-
gress would not want to include such a clause.
29 A hint of this idea can be found in id at 1328 n 109, but the argument there is focused on
the problem of excessive grants of discretionary authority. To repeat, there is no inconsistency
between our nondelegation argument and the entrenchment argument we made in Posner and
Vermeule, 111 Yale L J at 1665 (cited in note 26). Contrary to Alexander and Prakash's claim, we
do not use "legislative powers" in a special way, nor does our entrenchment argument rely on
any particular definition of that term. See Alexander and Prakash, 70 U Chi L Rev at 1309 n 41
(cited in note 2).
30 See Posner and Vermeule, 111 Yale L J at 1667-68 (cited in note 26). See also Rei-
chelderfer v Quinn, 287 US 315, 321 (1932) (construing an ambiguous statute to avoid deciding
the permissibility of entrenchment).
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power. The account fails in at least three respects: the evidence that
Alexander and Prakash offer for their account is systematically am-
biguous; the conclusion to which this evidence points has radical,
hence implausible, consequences; and Alexander and Prakash's ac-
count is inconsistent with their professed sympathy for the conven-
tional nondelegation doctrine. We will take up these points in turn.
First, the evidence that Alexander and Prakash offer is systemati-
cally ambiguous for present purposes; for reasons we will explain, it
predictably fails to cut between the competing conceptions of delega-
tion at issue. We cannot do a full review of the evidence in this limited
compass, so two brief examples will have to stand in for the whole.
Alexander and Prakash say we have misunderstood Locke's position
on delegation; their centerpiece is Locke's argument that:
This Legislative [power] is ... unalterable in the hands where the
Community have once placed it; nor can any Edict of any Body
else, in what Form soever conceived, or by what Power soever
backed, have the force and obligation of a Law, which has not its
Sanction from that Legislative, which the publick has chosen and
appointed."
Nothing here, however, is inconsistent with our account of dele-
gation. On our view, of course, "Edict[s]" or rules promulgated by the
executive branch pursuant to statutory authority do have precisely the
"sanction from [the] Legislative [body]" that Locke requires. Locke's
point is that executive edicts have no legal force unless they enjoy leg-
islative authorization-a point that the Youngstown Court reiterated, 2
and one that is part and parcel of our view. Alexander and Prakash
simply misread this passage to say that the relevant sanction or au-
thorization must come directly from the people, '" rather than (as
Locke permits) indirectly, from the legislators that the people have
"chosen and appointed." A similar point applies to Alexander and
Prakash's treatment of Montesquieu, whom they cite principally for
the abstract proposition that the legislative and executive powers
should not be combined in the same hands." We agree. The question at
31 John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, in Two Treatises of Government § 134
at 356 (Cambridge 1988) (Peter Laslett, ed).
32 343 US at 585 (explaining that the President's power to issue a regulation "must stem ei-
ther from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself").
33 See Alexander and Prakash, 70 U Chi L Rev at 1321 (cited in note 2) ("Locke repeat-
edly insists that only the people can authorize someone else to make laws/rules for them. If
someone not appointed by the people attempts to make binding rules, these rules are illegitimate
because the people have not ceded to these individuals the power to make laws over them.").
34 See id at 1312 (noting that Montesquieu "claimed that when the executive and legisla-
tive powers are 'united in the same person,... there can be no liberty, because apprehensions
may arise lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a ty-
rannical manner'), quoting Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws 182 (D. Appleton 1900) (Tho-
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issue here, however, is whether statutory grants of discretionary rule-
making authority to the executive violate the separation of powers
(the conventional view), or do not violate it (our view). On that en-
tirely distinct question Montesquieu has nothing to say.
The ambiguity in Alexander and Prakash's evidence is chronic
and systematic, for good reason. As we discussed in our original
treatment, early political theorists and the founding generation simply
did not focus on the question whether statutory grants of rulemaking
authority count as prohibited delegations. Their analyses, like Montes-
quieu's, are pitched at a higher level of abstraction; their general en-
dorsements of the separation of legislative and executive powers fail
to arbitrate between competing views about what counts as a violation
of the separation of powers-in particular, whether statutory grants of
authority effect a combination of legislative and executive power. That
relatively fine-grained institutional question was not taken up until
the First Congress actually began to run a government, with results
that support our account of delegation" -a point that Alexander and
Prakash conspicuously fail to dispute.
Secondly, whatever its other traits, Alexander and Prakash's view
of the legislative power can hardly be described as conventional. On
their view, remarkably, the power to enact statutes by voting in legisla-
tures is concededly "outside" ' the constitutional definition of legisla-
tive power. Rather, the legislative power is a power to make rules that
bind society. This means that the executive exercises legislative power
whenever it makes binding legal rules, even if the rulemaking occurs
under a valid grant of statutory authority; Alexander and Prakash are
quite explicit about this." But this means, of course, that the adminis-
trative state is unconstitutional.m The executive engages in constitu-
tional lawmaking, and thus exercises the legislative power that Article
I vests in Congress alone, whenever the executive makes administra-
tive rules. This is, of course, a proposition that the Supreme Court has
repeatedly and emphatically rejected. "
mas Nugent, trans).
35 See Posner and Vermeule, 69 U Chi L Rev at 1735-36 (cited in note 1).
36 Alexander and Prakash, 70 U Chi L Rev at 1308 (cited in note 2).
37 See id at 1305-06 (claiming that "[a] general pronouncement creating, modifying, or re-
scinding legal obligations and rights is a law, regardless of who pronounces it and irrespective of
whether the lawmaking is statutorily authorized or not").
38 Compare Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 Harv L Rev
1231, 1231 (1994) (arguing that "[tihe post-New Deal administrative state is unconstitutional").
39 See INS v Chadha, 462 US 919,953 n 16 (1983) ("When the Attorney General performs
his duties pursuant to § 244 [of the Immigration and Nationality Act], he does not exercise 'legis-
lative' power."); United States v Grimaud, 220 US 506,521 (1911) ("[Tjhe authority to make ad-
ministrative rules is not a delegation of legislative power.").
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In a footnote Alexander and Prakash try to pull back from the
cliff's edge, saying that "we don't believe that all rulemaking occurring
outside of Congress necessarily amounts to an exercise of legislative
power .... [F]or the Founders, the legislative power was a matter of
the degree/scope of the discretion." ' But this is an arbitrary retreat
from the logical consequences of their view. Recall that, on Alexander
and Prakash's account, the legislative power was and is "the power to
enact rules for society, whether those rules were called statutes, rules,
[or] regulations.""4 Any executive rulemaking that governs social be-
havior (a category that includes rulemaking through administrative
adjudication, not just rulemaking in the technical administrative-law
sense) is necessarily an impermissible exercise of legislative power;
there is no mistaking Alexander and Prakash's position here. Given
this radical premise, the only saving idea for Alexander and Prakash
would be Justice Stevens's idiosyncratic view that even if executive
rulemaking is lawmaking, Congress may delegate (some of) its law-
making power to the executive." But the Court has squarely rejected
that view," and it seems most unlikely that Alexander and Prakash
really want to defend it.
Our last point on legislative power and delegation is just that
Alexander and Prakash have no consistent view of the subject. Some-
times they seem to be defending a radically restrictive view of delega-
tion, one in which all executive rulemaking is unconstitutional. Some-
times they profess sympathy for the conventional nondelegation doc-
trine. But these two positions are mutually exclusive alternatives, not
complements. Of course Alexander and Prakash's project is just to
criticize our original critique of the conventional view. But one can de-
rive any proposition at all from a contradiction; it is not surprising that
Alexander and Prakash manage to derive their critical points from a
position that is at odds with itself.
III. SOME FURTHER ISSUES
A. Originalist Evidence
In our earlier article, we presented textual and structural argu-
ments against the existence of the nondelegation doctrine. We also
4) Alexander and Prakash, 70 U Chi L Rev at 1310 n 43.
41 Id at 1310.
42 See Whitman v American Trucking Associations, 531 US 457, 488 (2001) (Stevens con-
curring) (claiming that the Court "could choose to articulate [its] ultimate disposition of this is-
sue by frankly acknowledging that the power delegated to the EPA is 'legislative' but neverthe-
less conclude that the delegation is constitutional because adequately limited by the terms of the
authorizing statute").
43 See id at 472 (recognizing that the Constitution "permits no delegation" of Congress's
legislative powers).
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said that the historical evidence about the eighteenth-century mean-
ing of "legislative power" is sparse and ambiguous." Given the strong
textual and structural arguments against the doctrine, we thought it
obvious that the weak historical evidence could not have any bearing
on the question. Alexander and Prakash say that if we "believe that
there is insufficient historical evidence in favor of the sophisticated
view, [we] must think that even more true of the naive prohibition."4s
But we thought there was insufficient evidence for either view; that is,
the historical evidence predating the First Congress simply does not
shed light on the question of what the framers believed. Having read
Alexander and Prakash's survey of Locke, Montesquieu, and Black-
stone, we are even more firmly of this view. The historical evidence
shows that "legislative power" was not a term of art that was used in a
single way. It was used in too abstract a fashion to arbitrate between
competing views of delegation; therefore, the appearance of that term
in the Constitution and contemporary debates tells us nothing about
the nondelegation doctrine. In the absence of dispositive historical
evidence, our other textual and structural arguments stand on their
own feet.
B. The Parade of Horribles Revisited
Alexander and Prakash criticize us for "downplay[ing] the possi-
bility of grand delegations.""6 They argue that "one important reason
why Congress might not have passed [ ] grand delegations in the past
is that Congress never understood that it had such authority."7 They
do not provide any evidence for this dubious claim. The alternative
hypothesis is that Congress understood that it had the authority but
did not exercise it, just as Congress understood that it had the author-
ity to grant federal question jurisdiction to a federal court even
though it did not exercise this authority until 1875. 4" There is no his-
torical evidence, as far as we know, that Congress ever considered a
grand "delegation" (as Alexander and Prakash use the word) but then
refrained from acting because of the nondelegation doctrine; not even
a debate or public discussion in which a grand "delegation" was urged
by one member of Congress and opposed on nondelegation grounds
by another.
Alexander and Prakash assume that the nondelegation doctrine
was so deeply internalized by every member of Congress-and pre-
44 See Posner and Vermeule, 69 U Chi L Rev at 1733 (cited in note 1).
45 See Alexander and Prakash, 70 U Chi L Rev at 1326 (cited in note 2).
46 Id at 1327.
47 Id.
48 Fallon, Meltzer, and Shapiro, Federal Courts at 349 (cited in note 20).
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sumably the public as well -that it never occurred to anybody to pro-
pose, even to speculate publicly about, a grand "delegation." What
gives this argument its air of unreality-aside from the fact that the
well-educated framers and their successors knew of the historical ex-
amples of legislative abdication-is that Congress has repeatedly
vested enormous rulemaking powers in agents, and the difference be-
tween what Congress has done and what Alexander and Prakash have
in mind is just a matter of degree. For a short period of time some
statutes were expansive enough to worry the Supreme Court."v Since
the New Deal, the nondelegation doctrine has never been used to
strike down a statute-so the content of the doctrine, if not zero, is
trivial-and yet Congress has not considered the disappearance of the
nondelegation idea as a judicially enforced rule to be an invitation to
vest rulemaking power in a dictator. Why not? Surely not because of
the small possibility that the Supreme Court would resurrect the doc-
trine. The possibility of judicial interference rarely prevents Congress
from enacting a constitutionally questionable statute. If Congress
wants to accomplish something, it is willing to take a risk that a statute
will be struck down. The reason that Congress has not engaged in a
"grand delegation" is that it has not wanted to.
We suspect that Alexander and Prakash are led astray by an
overly conceptual notion of legislative power and constitutional re-
striction. They do not realize just how much "delegation" (in their
sense) is permitted by courts. Take this passage from another part of
their article:
Suppose the President negotiates a treaty with China that
authorizes the President to make international law commitments
through a document called the "P-treaty." Such P-treaties would
have the force of law upon presidential signing and would not
need Senate approval. Should the Senate ratify the initial treaty
with China, one might conclude that any subsequent P-treaties
would result from faithful presidential "execution" of the U.S.-
China Treaty. But we think it would be difficult to refute the no-
tion that the President is in fact making treaties without follow-
ing the specified constitutional process, and that he and the Sen-
ate are evading the Senate's treaty role. Calling presidential
treaty-making "treaty execution" does not avoid the issue.
Though the Senate has not gone this far, it is widely accepted in
foreign relations law that the President may on his own conclude
agreements that are expressly authorized by, or even "reasonably in-
49 See Panama Refining Co v Ryan, 293 US 388 (1935) (invalidating the hot oil provisions
of the National Industrial Recovery Act).
50 Alexander and Prakash, 70 U Chi L Rev at 1303 n 15 (cited in note 2).
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ferred" from, a prior treaty that had the consent of the Senate, and
thousands of international agreements with the force of law are the
result of such agreements between the President (alone) and foreign
heads of state." The nondelegation doctrine is as dead in the law of
foreign relations as it is in domestic law.
Our point is not that there is no conceivable world in which Con-
gress would vest its rulemaking powers in a dictator or in some other
way abdicate its responsibilities; indeed, critics of the administrative
state have been accusing Congress of abdication since the New Deal.
Our point is that constitution makers cannot foresee all possible bad
political outcomes and design a constitution that prevents them. The
drafters of the U.S. Constitution placed their faith in some very gen-
eral structural elements, a benign political culture, and a virtuous citi-
zenry. Because they believed that the branches would seek to expand
their power, not that they would try to give it away to each other in a
game of hot potato, the framers did not give much attention to consti-
tutional restrictions on the abdication of power. The framers did not
foresee the era of party politics, so they did not design the Constitu-
tion to prevent the pathologies of party politics, such as the one that
Alexander and Prakash describe.2 The framers understood that a
constitution designed to prevent any possible misuse of power would
be unworkable, and thus they avoided fine-tuning that might have pre-
vented both the grand delegations that Alexander and Prakash fear
and the administrative state that they seem to condemn. And the Su-
preme Court, after some tinkering in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, came to accept this judgment.
51 See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 303(3)
(ALl 1986) (stating that "the President may make an international agreement as authorized by
treaty of the United States"); Treaties and Other International Agreements: The Role of the
United States Senate, S Rep No 106-71, 106th Cong, 2d Sess 86-87 (2001) (noting that "the
President's authority to conclude [agreements pursuant to treaties] seems well-established").
52 See Alexander and Prakash, 70 U Chi L Rev at 1327 (cited in note 2).
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